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Abstract 
This paper studies the process of wage formation in a model with 
tnonopolistic competition in the goods market. After a discussion 
of the literature on real wage rigidity and hysteresis or 
persistence theories, a (partial equilibrium) model is presented 
based on both efficiency-wage and insider-outsider theory. In 
this model the firm and the union negotiate on the wage level. 
Given the outcome of this (Nash) bargaining process, the firm 
sets the price of its product, its output and employment level. 
The dynamic properties of the model are further analyzed in the 
setting of an intertemporal disequilibrium macroeconomic model. 
Although it is not possible to solve this model analytically, the 
time-paths of the variables after a shock to the economy can be 
traced numerically by applying the method of multiple shooting. 
The paper presents some results of these simulation experiments. 
The author wishes to thank Frank den Butter, Bernard Compaijen 
and Jan van Ours for their comments and Gerard Staarink for 
providing the multiple shooting routine. 
!• Introduction 
It is widely recognized that the assumption of wage rigidity is 
central to the explanation of unemployment. If wages are sticky, 
the labour market will fail to clear when (effective) demand is 
low, and a decline in (effective) demand will raise unemployment 
and lead to reductions in output. Af ter the war the conventional 
Keynesian approach was to express nominal wage stickiness by 
means of a Phillips-curve relationship in which wages and prices 
adjust gradually during unemployment. More recently, this 
approach has been modlfied such that in the long run the unem-
ployment rate converges to a slowly evolving natural rate which 
is determined by the composition of the labour force and the 
structure of the labour market. However, the concept of slow 
wage adjustment has been severely criticized, because it lacks a 
solid microfoundation based on the optimizing behaviour of 
economie agents. 
This paper provides a microfoundation for wage rigidity along the 
lines of new Keynesian macroeconomics in order to account for 
involuntary unemployment. Starting-point is the macroeconomic 
model with monopolistic competition and price rigidity outlined 
in Van de Klundert and Peters (1988). Our purpose is to 
incorporate into this model a process of wage formation which 
generates wage stickiness. Moreover, the microfoundations of this 
wage formation process are specified in such a way that we are 
able to account for the possibility of persisting unemployment. 
In section 2 we study some recent literature on wage rigidity 
and unemployment. Especially, the literature on the different 
variants of efficiency wages and hysteresis or persistence 
theories is analyzed. Following the exposition of section 2 with 
its separate discussions of main ingredients, section 3 provides 
a synthesis model in which these theories are regarded as 
complementary to each other. Subsequently, section 4 deals with 
the dynamics of the disequilibrium model with monopolistic 
competition in which now not only prices, but also wages are 
determined endogenously. 
The final section of this paper gives a summary of main results 
and conclusions. 
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2. Efficiency wages and hvsteresis theories 
The surveys by Fischer (1988) and Ratz (1988) discuss some recent 
developments in labour economics which are important for modern 
macroeconomics. They examine several explanations for wage 
rigidity and persistently high unemployment. With respect to wage 
rigidity the main contenders are: labour contracts, unions and 
efficiency wages. In this section we restrict ourselves to the 
latter, because in our opinion the efficiency-wage hypothesis is 
the more promising approach1 . This is not to say that both con-
tracting and unions are irrelevant to wage formation. In f act, 
both elements may be largely complementary to the approach based 
on efficiency wages. The role played by unions is of particular 
interest in theories of hysteresis. These theories are, as 
explanations of persistently high unemployment, the subject of 
the second part of this section. 
2.1 Efficiency wages 
The key relationship in efficiency-wage theories of unemployment 
is that the productivity of workers is a function of the wage 
paid. In this case, firms are unwilling to lower wages, even when 
there is an exces s supply of labour, because lower ing the wage 
may lower productivity more than proportionately, so that labour 
costs are actually increased. When the efficiency wage is higher 
than the market-clearing wage, involuntary unemployment results. 
The literature discusses four different microfoundations for this 
phenomenon2 (see Akerlof and Yellen (1986)). These microeconomic 
explanations are related to four benefits of paying higher wages: 
reduced shirking by employees due to a higher cost of job loss, 
lower turnover, improvement in the average quality of job 
applicants, and improved morale. 
Although the four theories differ in a number of respects, they 
have a common mathematical structure. In its simplest form this 
structure is given by the wage-productivity curve: 
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e = e(w), e - de/dw >0 (1) 
where e(o>) is the effort (or efficiency) of a worker receiving a 
real wage co (=w/p). If the (representative) firm sets the wage, 
it chooses a wage that minimizes the wage costs per efficiency 
unit, 
min w/e(w) 
Solving (2) yields the result: 
(w/e).e - 1 
(2) 
(3) 
This equation is known as the 'Solow condition' (see Solow 
(1979)): the elasticity of effort with respect to the wage is 
unity. Let co* be the solution to (3), then co* is the efficiency 
waee. In figure 1 it is shown that the efficiency wage is given 
by the point in which a line through the origin is tangent to the 
wage-productivity curve. In this point the first derivative of 
e(u>) is equal to e(co)lco. 
Assume that the firm operates with a production function given 
by y-f(e.n), where n is the number of workers. With output as our 
numeraire, the firm will pay a wage co* and will optimally hire 
labour up to the the point where the marginal product of labour 
is equal to the real wage co* i 
e(w*)f'(e(w*).n) = co* (M 
Figure 1. The graphical determination of the efficiency wage 
(see Stiglitz (1986, p. 183)) 
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Of course the firm only starts production if there is a profit to 
be made, so that labour productivity has to be higher than the 
real wage: f(e(w*).n)/n > u>* . 
In the aggregate, when labour demand falls short of labour supply 
and w* is higher than labour's reservation wage, the firm will be 
unconstrained by labour market conditions in pursuing its optimal 
policy, so that a disequilibrium results which is characterized 
by involuntary unemployment. 
The four microfoundations given for the efficiency-wage hypo-
thesis, actually suggest a more general formulation of the 
effort function in eq. (1). Most arguments, e.g. those based on 
labour turnover and workers' morale, suggest that rather than 
depending on absolute wages, effort depends on the relative 
attractiveness of opportunities inside and outside the firm. 
Opportunities outside the firm in turn depend on the general 
prevailing wage as paid by other firms, the unemployment rate and 
the level of unemployment benefits. Therefore, we should more 
generally specify e(.) as a function which also includes these 
outside variables in its arguments. An illustrative example in 
this context can be found in Summers (1988). In his article e is 
determined by (w±-x) , Osu^l, where o>t is the wage paid by firm 
i and x reflects workers' outside opportunities: 
x = w(l-U) + bU 
(5) 
=
 w(l-(l-p)U) 
where w is the general prevailing (real) wage (or the average 
real wage paid by other firms), U is the unemployment rate, b 
represents real unemployment benefits, and so p=b/u> which stands 
for the replacement ratio. The efficiency-wage level of u>t may 
then be calculated as x/(l-u), so that the firm pays its 
workers their opportunity costs plus a premium whose magnitude 
depends on the size of v, which measures the productivity-
enhancing effects of paying higher wages. An interesting 
implication of this model is that, since all firms are identical 
(so that in equilibrium wi=w), we may obtain a very simple 
expression for the market equilibrium rate of unemployment (U ): 
U* = Wd-P) (6) 
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The equilibrium rate of unemployment thus depends positively on 
the size of the productivity-enhancing effects of wage increases 
and on the attractiveness of unemployment. From this it is clear 
that any efficiency-wage model with e specified as efu^/w.U.p), 
immediately implies an equilibrium unemployment rate. 
The efficiency-wage model generatee a number of testable predic-
tions about the existence of non-competitive wage differentials. 
E.g. since the relationship between productivity and wage may 
differ from industry to industry, wages for similar workers may 
differ from industry to industry. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that there is a growing empirical literature studying the 
interindustry wage structure (see Katz (1988)). These studies, 
which are mainly based on US data, show that there indeed are 
large interindustry wage differences for observationally 
equivalent workers and that these wage differentials are very 
persistent3. Moreover, lower quit rates are observed in high-wage 
industries suggesting that workers in these industries are 
earning rents. Empirical evidence suggests a positive relation-
ship between wage differentials on the one hand and industry 
profitability, monopoly power, capital intensity and average 
education on the other hand. High-wage industries tend to pay all 
types of workers high wages. The evidence on the relationship 
between product market characteristics and wages and the 
similarity in differentials across occupations points to rent-
sharing explanations of wage differentials, i.e. if a firm has 
been making money in its output market it should share these 
benefits with its workers. Rent sharing is a corner-stone of the 
fair-wage efficiency-wage model (see Akerlof and Yellen (1988)) 
in which effort is stimulated by improved morale due to the 
payment of higher wages. When efficiency-wage considerations are 
present, firms may be able to survive by rent sharing, since wage 
increases then lead to less than proportionate increases in 
labour costs. In this respect Krueger and Summers (1988, p.280) 
correctly stipulate that "rent sharing is less expensive for 
firms in an efficiency-wage environment where changes in wages 
have no first-order effect on costs than it would be in a 
Standard competitive situation". 
Subsequently, efficiency-wage models also provide potential 
mechanisms through which cyclical fluctuations in output can be 
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generated by aggregate demand shocks. In this case, similar to 
the mechanism described in models with monopolistic competition 
on the product market, the failure of firms to adjust wages to 
email shocks leads to only second-order losses. However, this 
behaviour may generate first-order results at the macroeconomic 
levelA. 
It should of course be noted that efficiency-wage theories 
account for real rather than nominal wage rigidity. Since many 
macroeconomists believe that it is nominal rigidities, not real 
rigidities, that are to be explained, we are not to obfuscate 
this issue. Our own view may be characterized as largely prag-
matic. First of all, as also noted by Stiglitz (1986), the 
evidence on the crucial importance of nominal rigidities is not 
wholly convincing and still subject to further empirical 
research. In order to avoid a lenthy discussion of this matter 
here, we restrict ourselves to the observation that economies 
that have practised extensive indexing, so that real wages were 
rigid, have experienced episodes of unemployment just as 
economies in which indexing was not so widespread. Moreover, a 
number of important studies3 has stressed the decisive role of 
real wage rigidity, especially in European labour markets, in the 
explanation of the general rise of unemployment during the past 
two decades. Secondly, the use of efficiency-wage models does not 
preclude any role of nominal wage rigidity. For example, one 
could think of the fair-wage variant of these models. In this 
case, if each firm believes that all others are going to leave 
money wages unchanged, because individual workers have come to 
believe that money wage reductions are unfair, it would not be in 
the interest of any firm to change its money wage. Nominal wage 
rigidity then results from the difficulty of coordinating wage 
cuts across decentralised firms. In an economy with a history of 
low inflation rates, it may be natural to focus on the nominal 
wage, while in other economies with extreme indexing, it may be 
the real wage that is rigid. 
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2.2 Hysteresis and persistence theories 
The gloomy labour market situation of persistent mass unemploy-
ment in many industrialized countries, particularly in Europe, 
has been a strong stimulus for the development of the so-called 
'hysteresis theory'. At the heart of this theory is the idea that 
the equilibrium rate or so-called natural rate of unemplovment6 
depends on the history of the actual unemployment rate. With 
respect to unemployment, the notion of hysteresis may be illus-
trated by means of a general formulation of the Phillips curve7: 
Pt " Pt " a(Ut-Ut) (7) 
where t is a time subscript, p and pe represent, respectively, 
the actual and the expected rate of inflation. In this context, 
—* 
the equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment U , which cor-
responds to the steady-state solution, is usually called the 
NAIRU, i.e. the non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment. 
* 
Now let, according to some theory, Ut=bZt, where Zt is a vector 
of relevant variables. The possibility of hysteresis then arises 
* 
if the contemporaneous NAIRU (Ut) is also a function of past 
unemployment: 
U* - a U ^ i + bZt (8) 
Substitution of (8) in (7) then gives: 
Pt - p" - ctC^-aU^) + ctbZt (9) 
Hysteresis occurs if a=l. Imposing the steady-state conditions 
Pt "Pt an(^ ^t=^t-i' w e °btain the existence requirement that Z has 
an asymptotic value of zero, and no restriction on U. There is no 
longer a unique NAIRU. Any value is possible and actually 
depends upon the path of Zt, so that any temporary disturbance to 
Z will have a permanent effect on the NAIRU: 
Ü* = U0 + b.S Zt (10) 
t = o 
Of course, if a=0, we still have the case of the Standard natural 
—* — 
rate with NAIRU: U =bZ. More interesting and probably the most 
realistic, is the intermediate case 0<a<l. In this case there is 
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no complete hysteresis, because U -bZ/(l-a). Then the contempo-
raneous NAIRU eventually converges to its steady-state level 
whereas the speed of adjustment depends on a. The higher is a, 
the more slowly the NAIRU evolves to its steady-state level. The 
latter case is usually referred to as the case of persistence 
(or partial hysteresis) to distinguish it from the case of 
hysteresis, which strictly occurs when a«l. However, the litera-
ture does not apply this distinction very strictly and frequently 
uses the notion of hysteresis in cases where partial hysteresis 
or rather persistence may actually be meant. 
Recent literature (e.g. see Franz (1987)) suggests three types of 
explanations of hysteresis/persistence in unemployment, which may 
provide microfoundations for a relation like eq. (8). These refer 
to 
1) the shortage of physical capital; 
2) the process of wage bargaining; 
3) the depreciation of human capital. 
With respect to the first set of explanations we want to be 
brief. The basic idea of this approach is that supply and demand 
shocks in the 70s and 80s have decreased the rate of capital 
accumulation and have resulted in a shortage of capital. The 
scrapping of capital has reduced employment and, therefore, 
unemployment has risen. Consequently, hysteresis in capital 
formation has probably led to hysteresis in unemployment. The 
high utilization rates of the capital stock in the past few years 
combined with high unemployment or underutilization of labour, 
indeed point to the relevance of this capital-shortage hypo-
thesis. In a recent study Burda (1988) concludes on this issue 
that the shortage of capital has largely contributed to the rise 
of unemployment in Europe during the last fifteen years. He also 
outlines the mechanism that has been responsible for this 
development, namely, the interaction of wage formation and 
investment behaviour. Investment behaviour is very sensitive to 
properties of the production function, since the smaller the 
possibilities for substituting labour for capital, the more 
likely it is that capital really acts as a constraint. However, 
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it is in fact the degree of real wage rigidity that is of crucial 
importance here (or rather capital hysteresis may be explained 
by unemployment hysteresis). As the other two types of explana-
tions of hysteresis are more directly related to the structure of 
the labour market and to wage formation, we will concentrate on 
these theories, notwithstanding the apparent role of capital 
accumulation. 
Wage bareainine 
This explanation of hysteresis refers to the role of the 
unemployed in the wage bargaining process and comprises the 
insider-outsider models that have recently come to the f ore. 
Insider-outsider theory is based on the ideas that: a) it is 
costly for firms to replace their incumbent employees (insiders) 
with unemployed workers (outsiders) and that b) insiders are able 
to influence wage formation without taking into account the 
interests of the outsiders. The first variant of insider-outsider 
models which are mainly based on the former idea, is denoted as 
the turnover variant. Exatnples of such models are to be found in 
Lindbeck and Snower (1987, 1988) and Solow (1985). The second 
variant is referred to as the union variant and underlies the 
studies by Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987), Carruth and Oswald 
(1987) and Gottfries and Horn (1987). 
In the turnover variant insiders exploit and manipulate labour 
turnover costs in order to raise their wage rates. In other 
words, turnover costs provide insiders with the leverage neces-
sary to extract a share of the product market rents earned by 
firms, so that higher product demand is converted into higher 
wages for insiders rather than into increased access to jobs for 
outsiders. Several sources of turnover costs have been suggested 
in the literature. In order to replace an insider by an outsider 
costs of hiring, training and firing have to be incurred. More-
over, higher turnover may reduce workers' effort as in the effi-
ciency-wage model, while insiders by harassing entrants may also 
create a positive insider-entrant productivity differential. 
It should be clear that the distinction between insiders and 
entrants, which rests on the existence of labour turnover costs, 
is rather important for wage detérmination. When we assume that 
the insiders have complete market power and that each insider 
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views himself as the marginal employee in his firm, it is 
straightforward to show how the insider wage is determined8. Then 
the nominal insider wage will be set as high as possible, subject 
to two constraints. First of all, the insider must not become 
unprofitable to the firm, i.e. the real insider wage should be 
smaller or equal to the real marginal value product of (insi-
ders*) labour (with monopolistically competitive firms this also 
depends on the price elasticity of the firms' product demands). 
The second constraint is that the insider must be at least as 
profitable as the marginal entrant, which implies that the 
(nominal) insider wage should be set smaller or equal to the 
entrant's wage plus labour turnover costs. 
If insiders have some market power in the negotiations on 
nominal wages, then policy-induced shocks in aggregate labour 
demand may induce persistent changes in the level of unemploy-
ment. In this case, there is no natural rate of unemployment, 
because unemployment is not necessarily at a unique rate. The 
degree of persistence depends on the speed with which entrants 
may become insiders and with which dismissed insiders may become 
outsiders. In this way, possible asymmetries in the response of 
the negotiated wage to the level of activity within the firm, can 
also be explained. For example, Lindbeck and Snower (1988) have 
argued that the upward responsiveness of wages to pösitive supply 
shocks is greater than their downward responsiveness to negative 
ones. Nickell and Wadhwani (1988) correctly stipulate that this 
asymmetrie 'ratchet' occurs in Lindbeck and Snower's model, 
because laid-off workers immediately become outsiders whereas new 
entrants do not immediately become insiders (they first have to 
acquire firm-specific skills). 
Since the turnover variant of insider-outsider theory presumes 
not only that turnover costs exist, but also that the insiders 
may influence them and firms cannot entirely pass them back on to 
their workers by wage reductions, the insider-outsider models of 
this variant clearly suggest a rationale for unionization, 
because unions may help to raise firms' turnover costs. This 
provides a strong link with the second variant of insider-
outsider theory. 
In the union variant of insider-outsider theory the wage is the 
outcome of a bargaining process between the firm and the union 
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acting in the interests of their members. It is usually assumed 
that membership is closely related to the status of insider in 
the firm. The role of the union is formally modelled by means of 
a utility function representing its preferences with respect to 
wages and employment. A simple example of this kind of insider-
outsider models can be found in Blanchard and Summers (1986) for 
the one-period case. In this model labour demand (nd) is given by 
nd - -ctó + e (11) 
where co is again the real wage, c is a positive constant and € is 
a random technology shock (uniformly distributed). The union is 
supposed to maximize the utility of the representative member 
(insider) specified as: 
pen+ bw (12) 
where pett is the probability of being employed and b is the 
weight for renumeration. The lower b, the more importance workers 
attach to employment protection as opposed to the wage. If the 
wage is set unilaterally by the union, it is shown that the wage 
depends negatively on the initial number of insiders. Of course, 
in a more dynamic setting, there is a relation between employment 
in this period and the number of insiders in the next. An 
interesting case then is where the number of insiders equals 
employment. For this case with a given labour force, Blanchard 
and Summers (1986) derive that there is unemployment hysteresis. 
In a somewhat more complicated model Gottfries and Hom (1987, 
p. 881) reach a similar conclusion and summarize the propagation 
mechanism that generates persistence: ".., the smaller the number 
of workers employed in the previous period the higher the optimal 
wage, and hence the lower the expected employment level in the 
current period. A temporary shock in the previous period, which 
resulted in the layoff of some workers, will have a persistent 
effect in that it will reduce the expected employment level in 
the subsequent period, even though wage contracts have been 
negotiated anew after the initial contractionary shock". 
Of course, in reality the process of wage bargaining is more 
complicated than the picture presented by the models discussed 
above. Some additional considerations may then have to be taken 
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into account9. In the Netherlands, for example, unemployment 
benefits are financed by social security contributions by both 
employers and employees. Consequently, the interests of insiders 
and outsiders are linked together by the social security system. 
Depreciation of human capital 
The basic idea is that long spells of unemployment are likely to 
depreciate the skills of unemployed workers, vhich has a negative 
influence on the labour market position of these workers. This 
kind of hysteresis theory is usually referred to as duration 
theorv. Duration theory suggests a mechanism that may be well 
illustrated in the context of a search model. When the lack of 
work experience and other forms of training decreases producti-
vity of the long-term unemployed with unemployment duration, 
productivity can fa 11 below the reservation wage of these 
unemployed, so that their search activities will be curtailed. 
This effect will be strengthened by higher unemployment benefits 
and will decrease effective labour supply (and increase the 
natural unemployment rate). Moreover, this effect can be 
reinforced from the demand side of the labour market if employers 
use unemployment experience as a screening device. Employers, 
having a risk averse attitude, will then view job applicants with 
a history of unemployment as the less promising candidates for 
their vacancies. This effect will be stronger the easier it is 
for firms to fill their vacancies. 
There is an obvious relationship between long-term unemployment 
and outsider status, because insider-outsider theory and duration 
theory partly describe the same mechanism. For example, hiring 
the long-term unemployed requires more expenses by employers to 
give them proper on-the-job training than hiring short-term 
unemployed. Because of this rise in labour turnover costs, it can 
be stated that the larger the fraction of long-term unemployment 
in total unemployment, the smaller becomes the downward pressure 
of unemployment on wage formation. Therefore, the only difference 
between insider-outsider theory and duration theory is that the 
former focusses on the situation within the firm and the role of 
insiders, while the latter concentrates on the role of outsiders 
and on supply reactions in the labour market• 
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Finally, we want to make some further brief remarks on empirical 
investigations of the hysteresis phenomenon and on some recent 
theoretical developments that are related to hysteresis theories. 
A growing number of empirical studies addresses the question if 
there is any evidence of hysteresis in unemployment. Blanchard 
and Summers (1986) estimate several specifications of the wage 
equation and conclude that these estimations suggest a substan-
tial degree of hysteresis in some European countries, namely 
Germany, France and the United Kingdom, while the results for the 
United States provide evidence of much less hysteresis. In a more 
recent study Graafland (1988) arrivés at a similar conclusion. 
His results also show that hysteresis effects in the Netherlands 
are as relevant as in Germany and the United Kingdom1 °. 
According to hysteresis theory the situation on the labour market 
is history dependent and, therefore, very sensitive to shocks, so 
that some authors also speak of 'fragile equilibria'. In order to 
make employment equilibria fragile requires that we adduce 
considerations that either make labour supply potentially 
downward sloping or make labour demand upward sloping (see 
Blanchard and Summers (1988)). A relatively new approach to 
explaining equilibria with inefficiently low levels of employment 
has recently appeared in a number of papers (see Drazen (1987)). 
These (theoretical) papers study the existence of multiple 
equilibria in the level of economie activity, which opens the 
possibility that shocks may easily move an economy from one 
fragile equilibrium to another. Research on multiple equilibria 
actually suggests similar mechanisms as in the hysteresis 
theories discussed above. For example, there are multiple-equi-
libria models of the process of search and matching in the labour 
market (e.g. Diamond (1982)), where the possibility of making 
contact depends on the input by both sides of the market implying 
a sort of joint-production model for successful matches11. 
3. A svnthesis model of wage formation 
We base our discussion of wage formation with monopolistic 
competition in the goods market on Akerlof and Yellen (1985). In 
their efficiency-wage model there is a fixed number of identical 
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firms acting in a monopolistically competitive output market. 
Each firm sets its price and wage to maximize profits, under the 
assumption that changes in its own price will not affect the 
prices charged by rivals or the average price level. Accordingly, 
let the demand curve facing firm j be 
7j " (pJ/p)"e.K1(M/p), ö>l (13) 
where y. is output of firm j (as demanded by consumers), p, is 
the price charged by firm j, p is the average price level, M is 
aggregate money supply, 6 is the elasticity of goods in utility 
and Kj is a constant12. In long-run equilibrium all firms charge 
the same price so that the relation between aggregate output and 
aggregate money supply is consistent with a quantity theory 
(aggregate output is proportionate to aggregate real money 
supply). 
The firm produces output according to the Cobb-Douglas production 
function: 
7 j = (e.n)ak1_a (14) 
where e . is effort of workers hired, n is the number of hired 
workers, k is the capital stock and the parameter a lies between 
zero and one (note that the subscript j is not used for the 
variables e, n and k). Effort e is assumed to depend on the real 
wage paid w, (=w./p) according to the function e=e(w.). e(w,) is 
assumed to be a function whose elasticity with respect to co, is 
less than unity at high w. and is greater than one at low w. . 
Thus, in contrast with the model of Akerlof and Yellen (1985), 
production now also depends on the level of the capital stock and 
allows for substitution. 
Using the demand function and the production function we compute 
the profit function V, of firm j. Profits are equal to the price 
times output sold minus the money wage (w, ) times labour hired: 
VJ-pJ.(pJ/p)"eK1(M/p) - (wj/e).(pj/p)"e/a(K1.M/p)1/ak(a"1)/a (15) 
The firm chooses the price of its own output and the wage paid to 
its workers, so as to maximize profits. The first-order condi-
tions for profit maximization then yield 
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(Pj/P) « L(wj/e).(e/(e-l)a).(K1.M/p)U"a;'aJ (16) 
>k(a-l)(l+7)/e 
where 7«a(e-l)/(e(l-a)+a)>0, ands 
• .(w./e) - 1 (17) 
O) "J 
Eq. (16) states that the firm decides on its relative price p./p 
by setting some kind of a mark up on the real unit cost a>. /e of a 
labour efficiency unit. From (16) we may derive the number of 
hired workers: 
n - K 2 . e ^ W - ( 1 + ^ . ( M / p ) ( ( a - 1 ) ( 1 + ^ + 1 ) / a > . k ( 1 - a ) ( 1 + ^ ( e - 1 ) / e (18) 
where K2 is a constant that depends on Kx , a and 6. Eq. (17) 
again represents the Solow condition. Let w* denote the optirai-
zing level of the real wage in eq. (17), i.e. the efficiency 
wage. Then, in long-run equilibrium, when all firms charge the 
same price (p,=p for all j), the price level is given by 
p = {(w*/e(w*)).e/((e-l)a)}a/(1"a).K1M/k (19) 
Consequently, it is in the interest of the firm to pin the real 
wage to its eff iciency-wage level (real wage rigidity) and to 
decide on its price accordingly. 
Now, the assumption that the firm also sets the wage will be 
altered. In order to incorporate persistence we have to allow 
for some influence of workers on wage formation. It is plausible 
then to extend the model by introducing a union that looks after 
the interests of the workers and negotiates with the firm on the 
wage level. Subsequently, the outcome of this bargaining process 
is taken as given by the firm in the determination of its price. 
Thus, the fundamental idea is that wages are bargained ex-ante, 
but prices, Output and employment are set by the firm ex-post. 
We assume that the union is concerned only with the insiders who 
are n1 in number. Then the union operates with a utility func-
tion which is a representation of the interests of insiders. This 
function is supposed to depend on renumeration and the employment 
probability for insiders. Of course, the introduction of such a 
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probability only makes sense when we assume that goods demand is 
stochastic, so that eq. (13) has to be multiplied by a random 
variable. Accordingly, also employment in eq. (18) has to be 
multiplied by such a random variable. To keep things simple, we 
suppose that both random factors have a uniform distribution with 
mean one, where the latter is distributed across the range [1-r, 
1+r]. Let us define union utility in a simple way as (see Nickell 
and Wadhwani (1988)) 
p**.(Wj/p) + (l-peB)x (20) 
where p e m is the probability of employment for insiders and x is 
the expected level of earnings if the worker is laid off as given 
by eq. (5). The layoff probability for insiders l-pem is equal to 
the probability that n<nx times the average probability of layoff 
conditional on this event (where E[n] represents the mathematical 
expectation of n): 
l_pem = Probln'Cn1 ] ' E[n |n<n
x] 1 £. (21) 
We suppose that the outcome of the bargaining process is based on 
the Nash model, so that we have to establish the proper status-
quo points that each side of the bargain would achieve if bargai-
ning breaks down (see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986)). 
In the union case this is x, since the insiders can always attain 
this level of earnings outside the firm. For the firm case we 
assume that there are no fixed costs of production, so that its 
status-quo point is zero13. Thus the Nash objective to be 
maximized is (for given p and x) 
peffi(wj/p - x)(E[Vj])/3 (22) 
where the firm is concerned with expected profits and the expo-
nent p (>0) is an indicator of the firm's (relative) bargaining 
power. The first-order condition for (22) reduces to 
wj/(wj-(p.x)) = -/3(wj/Vj)(3Vj/awj) - (wj/pen)(3pelD/awj) (23) 
At the RHS of eq. (23) we find the wage elasticity of the firm's 
profits and the wage elasticity of insiders' employment probabi-
lity. The lower is 0, the more important is the latter elasti-
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city. Moreover, the negotiated money wage is decreasing in /3 if 
the wage elasticity of the firm's profits is negative14. 
Analogous to the derivation by Nickell and Wadhwani (1988), it 
can be shown that 
(Vj/VjJ.OVj/dWj) - -7(l-Mjew/e) (24) 
and 
-%.*£! , . ^2-d-r)2]
 [(1+7).7.w e /e] (25) 
p^'Sw., Arp-(jj-(l-r)) L U + 7 > T* wj e w / e J *"' 
where j;*=nI/n, with n mean employment ex-post. So that the elasti-
city of effort with respect to the wage appears in both equa-
tions. Substitution of eq. (24) and (25) in (23) now gives 
— " j — = j37[l-w.e /e] + T ^ - ^ ^ - J T - . [l+7(l-w,e /e)] (26) Wj-p.x ^' J w 4rji-(;j-(l-r)) J u> 
Eq. (.26) completes the model and represents a combination of both 
the efficiency-wage and the insider-outsider model of wage forma-
tion. Clearly, the Solow condition plays an important role. E.g. 
if the real wage is lower than the efficiency wage, so that 
1-w.e /e<0, then the negotiated money wage is increasing in p, 
while it is decreasing in /3 for real wages higher than the effi-
ciency wage. Consequently, the firm tries to bargain the money 
wage towards the level p.w*. On the other hand, the union tries 
to earn rents on behalf of the insiders in the firm. This 
endeavour is facilitated by the fact that wage increases lead to 
less than proportionate increases of labour costs, because of the 
efficiency-wage relationship. (Moreover, small shocks in 
aggregate demand have only second-order effects on the firm's 
profits). 
In order to clarify the role of insiders, we have to find some 
expression for pi. Hote that the combination of eq. (13) and (14) 
gives 
/v M/ x-i/e . .a/e . (i-a)/e ,07. 
p = pj^Kj.M/p) .(e.n) .k (27) 
Substituting this equation in (18), we obtain after some 
manipulations (for given p) 
p = n1/^ = K3.(wj/(e.Pj))1/(1"a).(nI/k) (28) 
18 
where K3 is a constant that depends on the parameters. Thus, 
besides the more familiar factors as wages and prices, vage 
formation is also determined by the ratio between the number of 
insiders and the available capital stock. If we log-linearise 
(26), making use of (5), (28) and substituting the function 
e(Wj), we arrive at an expression for w, as a function of w, p, 
U, p and the ratio of insiders and the level of the capital 
stock. 
Then U appears in the wage equation as a consequence of the 
specification of union utility instead of being a re-sult of effi-
ciency-wage considerations. In long-run equilibrium when all 
firms charge the same price p and pay the same wage w, we may 
solve for the equilibrium rate of unemployment by using the price 
rule (eq. (16)), the wage equation (eq. (26)) and the labour 
demand equation (eq. (18)) accompanied by some assumption 
concerning labour supply. 
It is clear that with eq. (26) duration theory has receded some-
what into the background. However, section 2.2 illustrates that 
insider-outsider and duration theory are closely related, since 
duration theory describes how workers may become outsiders. 
Moreover, it is fairly straightforward to introducé duration 
elements in the present model. For example, by assuming that the 
union takes account of short-term unemployment in its utility 
function instead of total unemployment. 
4. Simulations with a macroeconomic model under perfect foresight 
In this section we show the consequences of incorporating 
efficiency wages and insiders' influence on wage formation in a 
macroeconomic model with quantity rationing. We implement these 
features in the intertemporal disequilibrium model presented by 
Van de Klundert and Peters (1988). This model is very similar to 
that of Meydam (1987), but it ignores the possibility of a 
repressed inflation regime with excess demand on both the labour 
and the goods market, so that the problematic switch between the 
Keynesian unemployment and the repressed inflation regime is 
excluded. The remaining regimes are both characterized by 
unemployment (classical or Keynesian) which represents our main 
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line of interest. Both forroer models may be considered as a 
further development of the model presented by Blanchard and Sachs 
(1982). 
Van de Klundert and Peters (KP) apply virtually the same specifi-
cation of monopolistically competitive behaviour of the (repre-
sentative) firm in the goods market as given by eq. (13) in 
section 3. However, in their model also attention is given to the 
dynamics generated by investment and price adjustment. We now 
discuss the various equations in this model and indicate where 
changes with respect to the previous KP-model are implemented. 
Capital accumulation is assumed to depend on gross investment, 
i., and depreciation at an exponential rate 6: 
kj - ij - ókj, 6a0 (29) 
In order to derive a well-behaved investment function (with 
investment increasing in the shadow price of installed capital or 
Tobin's q), installation costs of capital are introduced. The 
investment expenditure function including these costs is 
specified as 
gj =g(ij,kj),
 g l>0, gk<0, g i i>0 (30) 
The function g is assumed to be convex in i., and homogeneous of 
degree 1 in its arguments i, and k,. 
The adjustment of prices is assumed to be costly and speed-
dependent, as customers prefer small and recurrent price changes 
to larger but more sudden changes. The (quadratic) cost of 
adjustment function is then given by 
h J - 2 ^ - « ! ( 3 1 ) 
where s.=p./p with p.=dp,/dt 1 5, and TJ>, is a parameter. 
In order to allow for efficiency wages the production function in 
the KP-model is amended and written as 
yj = f(ej.Uj,kj) (32) 
so that production is a function of capital and labour in 
efficiency units, where also a more general specification is 
added for the effort function e^: 
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e, - e(w.,U), e >0, e„>0, (33) 
so that effort also depends on the unemployment rate. We assume 
* 
that for any U6(0,l) there is an efficiency wage w,(U). 
Denoting the discount factor by 
t 
d(t) H exp(-J" R8ds), (34) 
the value of the firm (at the average price level) which is to be 
maximized is 
Vj(0) = yj^^Ry-^^^H-sj^ ~h^ d(t)dt (35) 
Decisions made by the representative firm with regard to its 
product price and employment level are supposed to have only a 
negligible effect on their aggregate counterparts. Since the 
nominal wage w. is given to the firm from the bargaining process 
with the local union, the effort level of its workers is also 
given to the firm. 
The firm now maximizes V, subject to the constraints given by eq. 
(29), (30), (31), (32) and a possible deraand constraint as 
visualized by eq. (13). We assume that the supply of labour is 
infinitely elastic, so that the firm cannot be rationed on its 
labour demand (and the regime of repressed inflation is ex-
cluded). The firm's model resembles an optimal control problem 
with instrument variables n, , i, and s, , and state variables k. 
and p.. The Hamiltonian of this problem is 
Hj = d. 
1 o 
yjP^ - nif- - s ^ j ' V " 2^7SJ + q 3 ( i r 6 k i ' 
— 0 
+ U j S j + A j { K 0 ( p j / p ) - f t e j . n j . k j ) } (36) 
where the costate variables q. and u,/p are adjoint to the state 
variables k, and p, . K0 represents Kx (M/p) from eq. (13), while 
AJ is the Lagrangean multiplier related to the demand constraint 
that is to be interpreted as a shadow price. 
Apart from the production technology with a variable effort 
level, the model is similar to that of the KP-model. This 
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altemative production technology has only minor consequences for 
the specification of the model equations, since the effort level 
is given to the firm, so that for derivations we refer to the KP-
article. Given the paths of w, , p, the nominal rate of interest 
R and initial values k,(0) and Pj(0), the model gives a 
solution for Ji , n^ , kj, ij, pj, q^, u^ and X. for t>0. 
In order to arrive at the formulation of a macroeconomic model, 
we assume that demand elasticities are uniform across firms. It 
can be shown that eq. (13) then changes in 
7j = (y/N).(Pj/p)"e, j-l,..,H (37) 
where N denotes the number of firms in the economy. The average 
price level is then represented by the following index of firms' 
prices: 
M
 1-e (l/N). 2 ?. ° 
j-i J . 
1/(1-6) 
(38) 
The demand system defined by eq. (37) and (38) is consistent with 
maximization of the consumers' utility function UT: 
UT = i y i ( e- 1 ) / e (39) 
j-i "* 
subject to the expenditure constraint 
2 p,y, = py (40) 
In the (macroeconomic) Nash equilibrium all firms choose the same 
price: Pj=p for all j. The individual f irm' s model can then be 
generalized to the macroeconomic level, where total demand equals 
the sum of aggregate investment expenditure and aggregate con-
sumption. 
To simplify, consumer behaviour in the KP-model is not modelled 
consistent with eq. (39), instead a Standard consumption function 
is used: 
c = c(y,R,G), cy>0, cR£0, cn2=0 (41) 
where n symbolizes real wealth: k+(M/p). 
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Whereas the supply of money (M) is exogenous, the demand for 
money follows from the Standard specification: 
(M/p) - m(y,R,n), B ^ X ) , %<(), m ^ O (42) 
The macroeconomic model is complete, when also wage behaviour is 
described. Van de Klundert and Peters use a traditional Phillips-
curve equation, in which the nominal wage rate responds to excess 
demand in the market for labour over time. Of course, the 
bargaining process as given in eq. (26) is essentially different 
from wage behaviour represented by a Phillips curve. We apply a 
wage equation that is in the spirit of eq. (26). 
It is not possible to simply adopt the complete specification of 
eq. (26) in the present macroeconomic model. First of all, the 
fact that the latter is a perfect foresight model interferes with 
the stochastic element which underlies the derivation of eq. 
(26), especially the factor that depends on p and r. Secondly, 
the nominal wage rate given by eq. (26) is based on a one period 
model. Consequently, in the intertemporal setting of firm 
behaviour, wage behaviour does abstract from the fact that 
today's decisions affect tomorrow's outcomes and may therefore be 
considered as myopie. Thirdly, if one prefers to hold the real 
wage within a close range of its efficiënt level, eq. (26) gives 
rise to huge unemployment rates, especially when effort does not 
depend on unemployment, or very large values for /S and 7, which 
seems rather unrealistic. A related aspect is the aggregation of 
firms. Eq. (26) is actually based on the bargaining process on 
the individual firm level between the firm's management and the 
local union representing the firm's insiders. Thus, if we apply 
eq. (26) in a macroeconomic model with w.=w, then we implicitly 
assume that bargaining takes place at the central level. An 
interesting result in this respect is the conclusion of Hoel 
(1988) that in the presence of efficiency wage considerations, 
provided the labour demand elasticity is not too much larger than 
one, local wage bargaining gives a higher negotiated wage than 
central wage bargaining, resulting in higher unemployment. 
With the foregoing problems in mind, we postulate a wage equation 
which retains the main characteristics of and is derivable from 
eq. (26). These characteristics are: a) the firm trying to nego-
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tiate the wage towards its efficiënt level; b) the union securing 
employment for its members at the highest possible wage. We may 
then write the negotiated wage (w°) as a weighted average of the 
(nominal) efficiency wage (w*-w*.p) as preferred by the firm and 
the union's target wage (w11), with the weights depending on 
relative bargaining strength: 
v*t - /3jV* + /32w^, ^ + ^ - 1 (43) 
Assuming that the actual wage is continuously adapted to the 
outcome of wage negotiations, a specification for a wage equation 
is given by 
w = /31(w*-w) + /32(w"-w) (44) 
where w=dw/dt. We assume that the difference between the union's 
target wage and the actual wage is proportionate to the diffe-
rence between the actual employment level and the number of 
insiders, and write (44) as 
w = /31(w*-w) + /32w(n-nx) (45) 
The latter assumption is mainly justified on grounds of the 
union's endeavour to maintain insiders' employment. If total 
labour in efficiency units (e.n) is taken as given by the union, 
it may compute the desired wage rate in order to equalize the 
number of hired workers and the number of insiders by (for given 
p and U) 
n-n1 w"-w 
w 
.(w/e).(3e/aw) (46) 
Thus, w(n-nx) may be regarded as an approximation of (wu-w), when 
n"=l and the real wage lies close to the efficiency wage, so that 
the (partial) elasticity of effort with respect to the real wage 
is close to one. Consequently, union behaviour has a positive 
effect on the wage rate whenever the employment level rises above 
the number of insiders and a negative effect whenever employment 
falls below insiders' employment16. 
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Because of the influence of insiders on wage behaviour, the wage 
equation has to be supplemented by some membership rule. We will 
assume here that the number of insiders follows the level of 
employment so that: 
n1 - «/(n-n1), Osi/£l (47) 
The f uil macroeconomic model is now written in table 1. The 
equations (a) — (o) in table 1 are identical to the equations in 
the KP-model except for the functions f(.) and e(.)» while the 
eq. (p) and (q) are different. 
It is clear that two regimes are possible, depending on the 
values of the exogenous variables and the parameters of the 
model. When A=0, consumers are rationed, because labour is too 
expensive to produce according to demand. Then, demand is not 
binding and firtns equate the marginal product of labour with the 
real wage. Under these circumstances, the economy is in the 
classical regime. When A>0, the demand constraint is binding, so 
that aggregate demand determines what can be supplied. In this 
case the Keynesian regime prevails. 
In a stationary state we have: k=q=p=u=w=nI=0. Substituting these 
conditions in the model equations of table 2 gives the following 
long-run solutions: u*=0, A*=l, n1*-^*, i*=6k*. Apparently, in 
the long run the demand constraint is always binding, so that the 
stationary state is characterized by Keynesian unemployment. 
In order to study the short-run impact of changes in exogenous 
variables and the adjustment process towards a new long-run equi-
librium, we apply the method of multiple shooting as explained in 
Lipton, Poterba, Sachs and Summers (1982). This method generates 
a path from the initial stationary state to the new stationary 
state, which is consistent with the dynamic properties of the 
model. An essential assumption here is that of saddlepoint stabi-
lity, i.e. the number of eigenvalues with a positive real part 
must be equal to the number of non-predetermined state variables 
in the system (q and u). This saddlepoint property has been 
checked for all our numerical simulations given below17. 
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Table 1. The fuil macroeconomic model (or amended KP-model) 
(a 
(b 
(c 
(d 
(e 
(f 
(8 
(h 
(i 
(j 
(k 
(1 
(m 
(n 
(o 
(P 
(q 
yd _ cd + g(i,k) 
nd - nd(yd,k) 
nw - nw(w/p,k) 
yw - f(e.nw,k) 
y - min(yd,yw) 
n = min(nd,nw) 
cd = cd(y,R,k) 
gi(i.k) = q 
M/p = m(y,R) 
X = max 0, 6{1 - w p£n(e.nd,k) 
c = cd - (yd - y) 
k = i - ók 
effective demand 
Keynesian demand for 
labour 
demand for labour in 
case of rationing in 
the goods market 
output in case of 
rationing in the 
goods market 
actual output 
actual employment 
consumption function 
investment function 
LM curve 
shadow price of the 
sales constraint 
rationing rule for 
consumption 
capital accumulation 
q =(R+5)q-(l - -)fk(e.n,k)+gk(i,k) costate variable 
for k 
price formation 
e 
P = V>up 
u = (R + ( p / p ) ) u - (1 - A)y 
w = /3X (w* - w) + /32w(n - n 1 ) 
n 1 = v(n - n 1 ) 
costate variable 
for p 
wage formation 
membership rule 
Where the following specifications are applied: 
cd = Ty consumption function 
f(e.n,k) = e(e.n) k production function 
,a T e = a + b(U°/(l-U°)) w effort function (with 
g = i[l + 9(i/k)] 
M/p = xyR -r 
outsiders unemployment) 
investment expenditure function 
liquidity preference function 
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The parameter values for our macroeconomic model are listed in 
table 2. These values have been chosen equal to the ones used by 
Van de Klundert and Peters (1988) and may be considered as fairly 
realistic (for a country like the Netherlands during the mid-
eighties). The parameters a, b, r and o, all referring to the 
efficiency-wage relationship (see table 1), were set at such 
values that the initial stationary state is similar to the one in 
the KP-model with respect to both nominal (R, p, w) and real 
variables (k, n, y, c, i). The latter parameters are not claimed 
to be realistic. In the case of o, Weinrich (1988) uses a some-
what smaller order of magnitude. The parameters /3j and /32 which 
represent bargaining strength have a similar arbitrary nature. 
Our model also exhibits an equilibrium unemployment rate, as 
effort also depends on unemployment. Equilibrium unemployment is 
equal to 14% of the labour force and ns was fixed accordingly. 
The assumption was made here that effort depends on the unemploy-
ment rate of outsiders instead of the actual unemployment rate. 
This may be justified by taking into consideration that workers 
will be less afraid of unemployment as long as they remain insi-
ders, since the union will try to protect insiders' employtnent. 
The denomination 'unemployment rate of outsiders' is not very 
precise, because outsiders are not necessarily unemployed, 
whereas insiders may also be unemployed (v<l). If insiders are 
Table 2. Parameter values used in computations 
Parameters: 
a = 0.625 T = 0.8 
6 = 0.1 r = 0.15 
6 = 5 e = 5 
X = 0.25 V> = 0.1 
a = -4.0 b = 6.6919301 
o = 0.125 T = 0.2 
e = 1 V = 0.33 
Pi = 0.5 Pi = 0.5 
Values of exogenous variables: 
ns = 1.1627906 M = 100 
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laid off, a number of them may be considered as temporarily unem-
ployed, since they are perceived to be put to work in due time. 
On the other hand, outsiders that have found a job, are not 
readily accepted as insiders, because their employment may be 
regarde as transitory. Therefore, U° is actually equal to the 
percentage of outsiders in the labour force. In fact, ü° func-
tions as a contemporaneous equilibrium unemployment rate (see 
section 2.2). 
The results for a once and for all 5 per cent decrease in the 
money stock (M) at t=0 are presented in table 3, both for our 
model as well as for the Van de Klundert and Peters model (KP-
model). Clearly, money is not neutral in the short run if price 
changes are costly. However, whereas the resulting price rigidity 
causes a recession with a substantial decline in output and 
employment in the KP-model, this recession is at the outset much 
milder in our model and transforms into a prolonged cyclical 
movement towards the new stationary state. This cyclic behaviour 
is reminiscent of Weinrich (1988). He also used a model based on 
monopolistic competition and labour effort depending on the real 
wage and the unemployment rate. Like in our model, a demand shock 
urges firms to adjust output and employment. But as the unemploy-
ment rate changes, the efficiency wage changes too. This causes 
firms to adjust their nominal wages and prices and, accordingly, 
to revise their labour and production decisions. Weinrich showed 
that the resulting dynamics is typified by counterclockwise 
movements in the output-inflation-plane. He concluded that size 
and length of these movements depend on the elasticity of effort 
with respect to the unemployment rate, so that the relatively 
high value of o, may account for the strong cyclicity of our 
model. 
Nominal wage behaviour in the KP-model is simply governed by 
unemployment and only indirectly influenced by price changes. In 
our model, nominal wage changes reflect the outcome of a conti-
nuous bargaining process between employers and union with a more 
complicated background. Employers want to adjust the nominal 
wage in order to reach the efficiënt real wage, while the union 
tries to insure employment of insiders and to enforce favourable 
wage settlements, which may intensify cyclical movements. It is 
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Table 3. A 5 per cent decrease in money8 
3a. Results for the model of table 1 
Period SS 
Variable 0 1 2 5 10 20 
consumption -1.3 1.4 2.8 1.1 -1.3 -0.9 0 
investment -1.0 1.1 2.2 0.9 -1.0 -0.6 0 
output -1.3 1.4 2.8 1.1 -1.3 -0.9 0 
employment -2.1 -2.3 -1.7 0.8 -0.1 0.4 0 
interest 29.0 17.6 4.0 -17.8 11.4 1.2 0 
1.03 1.08 1.11 1.07 0.92 0.96 
capital 0 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.2 
Tobin's q -0.5 0.5 1.0 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 
price 0 -4.0 -7.1 -8.7 -2.2 -4.0 
ub -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.0 0.0 
wage rate 0 -2.3 -5.5 -10.2 -1.4 -4.3 
insiders 0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.5 0.6 0.3 
0 
o 
-5 
0 
-5 
0 
3b. Results for the KP-model 
Variable 0 1 
Period 
2 5 10 
SS 
consumption -4.1 -2.4 -1.4 -0.3 -0.1 0 
investment -3.1 -1.9 -1.1 -0.3 -0.2 0 
output -4.1 -2.4 -1.4 -0.3 -0.1 0 
employment -6.5 -3.7 -2.0 -0.2 0.0 0 
interest 6.4 4.0 2.7 0.8 0.3 0 
1.10 1.07 1.05 1.01 1.00 
capital 0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 0 
Tobin's q -1.6 -0.8 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0 
price 0 -2.0 -3.3 -4.7 -4.8 -5 
ub -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 0 
wage rate 0 -2.5 -3.8 -5.0 -5.0 -5 
a. In percentage deviations from the original stationary state. 
b. In levels (A and u are shadow prices). 
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therefore not surprising to see a rising real wage in period 1 
and 2 in our model, while it is falling in the KP-model. 
The rise of the nominal interest rate when the shock occurs 
(292), may appear relatively large. However, it only amounts to 
about one percentage point (see the appendix). 
The results for a supply shock are listed in table 4. This shock 
is in the form of a permanent decline in total factor produc-
tivity (e) of 5 per cent at t-0. Then in both models, output and 
the capital stock decrease at the same rate in the long run. 
However, in our model also employment falls in the long run. 
Again, in our model, there is cyclic convergence towards the new 
stationary state. With respect to output the initial decline is 
larger in our model than in the KP-model, because of a more 
severe reduction of profitability due to the fall in producti-
vity. Therefore, the initial rise of employment is much lower in 
our model. Clearly, our model is in the long run more sensitive 
to a supply shock. The adjustment process lasts for some time in 
both cases. 
Just as in the KP-model the demand constraint is less binding 
(A<1) during the first few periods, because supply is depressed 
by the cost increase. As X is positive, firms produce what can be 
sold in both models. 
In the model with efficiency wages and insiders' influence the 
process of adjustment is generally more prolonged. However, there 
is no hysteresis in the unemployment rate. Unemployment just 
cyclically converges towards its new equilibrium rate. When, for 
example, the firms would have no influence on wage bargaining 
(/Sx =0), there would be a zero root in the dynamic system of our 
model, so that hysteresis would be the case. 
It is interesting to note that the results for our model are in 
several ways qualitatively different from those for the KP-model. 
Nevertheless, both models are largely similar with respect to 
their dominance of the Keynesian regime. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have outlined some major theories which account 
for the existence of (real) wage rigidity and the persistence of 
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Table 4. A 5 per cent decrease in productivity8 
4a. Results for the model of table 1 
Variable 0 1 
Period 
2 5 10 20 
SS 
consumption -4.9 -7.3 -8.2 -6.3 -6.8 -7.5 -9.7 
investment -3.7 -5.6 -6.5 -5.3 -5.9 -7.0 -9.7 
output -4.9 -7.3 -8.2 -6.3 -6.8 -7.5 -9.7 
employment 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -2.9 -0.9 -1.8 -1.9 
interest -28.2 -16.8 -5.2 4.4 -18.9 -8.3 0 
0.79 0.81 0.82 0.97 1.04 1.03 
capital 0 -0.5 -1.0 -2.3 -3.4 -5.8 -9.7 
Tobin's q -1.8 -2.6 -2.8 -1.5 -1.3 -0.7 0 
price 0 4.9 8.1 7.4 3.9 6.7 10.7 
ub 0.6 0.4 0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.0 0 
wage rate 0 1.3 3.8 4.3 -3.3 -0.3 2.0 
insiders 0 0.1 0.1 -1.2 -1.7 -1.9 -1.9 
4b. Results for the KP-model 
Variable 0 1 
Period 
2 5 10 
SS 
consumption -2.7 -4.8 -5.7 -6.0 -6.1 -7.9 
investment -2.0 -3.7 -4.5 -5.0 -5.4 -7.9 
output -2.7 -4.8 -5.7 -6.0 -6.1 -7.9 
employment 4.0 0.6 -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0 
interest -16.5 -12.3 -10.1 -7.7 -6.7 0 
Ab 0.73 0.86 0.93 1.00 1.00 1 
capital 0 -0.3 -0.7 -1.7 -3.1 -7.9 
Tobin's q -1.0 -1.7 -1.9 -1.7 -1.2 0 
price 0 3.0 4.3 5.1 5.4 8.6 
ub 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0 
wage rate 0 1.0 0.9 -0.5 -1.1 0 
a. In percentage deviations from the original stationary state. 
b. In levels (X and u are shadow prices). 
31 
unemployment. Two of these theories, namely efficiency-vage and 
insider-outsider theory, were combined in one model based on 
monopolistic competition in the goods market and wage bargaining 
between the firm and the local union. Whereas the firm tries to 
bargain the nominal wage towards its efficiënt level, the union 
weighs higher wages for its members against the possibility of 
members being laid off. 
This bargaining process was incorporated in a macroeconomic, 
intertemporal disequilibrium model. The effects of a demand and a 
supply shock in this model were compared with the adjustment 
process for a similar model in which wage behaviour was governed 
by the traditional Phillips curve. 
Our main result is that, whereas the convergence process towards 
the new stationary state in the latter model is mainly monotonie, 
the adjustment process in the former model is generally much more 
prolonged and has cyclic features. The latter characteristic 
depends to a large extent on the elasticity of effort with 
respect to unemployment. 
The combination of cyclical and prolonged adjustment appears to 
be more in accordance with recent labour market experience than 
adjustment behaviour in the KP-model. This leads us to conclude 
that both efficiency-wage and insider-outsider theory are 
important for macroeconomic modelling. 
It should be emphasized that the model simulations serve to 
demonstrate important differences in adjustment behaviour and 
their actual relevance is rather limited. Only basic relation-
ships are modelled, while the applied (constant) parameters 
should be determined empirically, because the values of the para-
meters greatly influence the dynamics of the model. 
Further research is also needed in order to assess the importance 
of central relative to local wage bargaining. Since the effi-
ciency-wage relation is basically a microeconomic concept, it 
should be examined whether unions prefer local wage bargaining 
when effort functions differ from industry to industry, and, 
accordingly, whether a macroeconomic effort function is relevant 
or not. 
Clearly, the fact that the classical regime does not appear in 
our simulations, urges us to believe that there are still some 
important elements missing in the model. International corope-
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tition is probably one of these elements, since, in a more 
competitive world with price inflexibility, an adverse supply 
shock (like a decrease in productivity) is likely to result in 
classical unemployment. 
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APPENDIX 
Stationary-state values up to four digits for the macro 
economie model in table 1 (denoted by a ' * ' ) : 
consumption c* = 0.9507 
investment i* - 0.1584 
output y* - 1.1884 
employment n* - 1.0 
labour force (exogenous) ns* - 1.1627 
unemployment U* - 0.14 
nominal interest rate R* - 0.0375 
capital k* - 1.5845 
Tobin's q q* - 2.0 
output price p* - 205.6844 
wage rate w* - 122.2178 
number of insiders n1* = 1.0 
shadow price of the sales revenue X* " 1.0 
shadow price of a price increase u* = 0.0 
These values are identical to the ones for the KP-model 
except for ns* and U*. ns* is 1.0 and U* is 0.0 in the 
KP-model. 
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For a comparison of unemployment theories based on implicit 
contracts and efficiency wages we refer to Stiglitz (1986). 
Stiglitz (1986) actually sums up five. He also mentions a 
nutritional variant. 
In a recent study Wadhwani and Wall (1988) also present 
evidence for the efficiency-wage hypothesis based on micro-
data. However, they use a somewhat different approach. They 
attempt to test the efficiency-wage model by examining some 
of its predictions for the determinants of a firm's 
productivity. 
For an illustration we refer to Weinrich (1988). 
E.g. Bruno and Sachs (1985) and Grubb, Jackman and Layard 
(1983). 
Friedman (1968) gave the Standard definition of the natural 
rate of unemployment as "the level that would be ground out 
by the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, 
provided there is imbedded in them the actual structural 
characteristics of the labour and commodity markets, 
including market imperfections, stochastic variability in 
demands and supplies, the cost of gathering information 
about job vacancies and labour availabilities, the cost of 
mobility and so on." 
For a more general formulation see Giavazzi and Wyplosz 
(1985) and Wyplosz (1987). 
For this derivation we refer to Lindbeck and Snower (1988). 
See Van Rompuy (1987). 
For a more detailed discussion of the Dutch wage equation 
making use of the cointegration technique see Graafland and 
Huizinga (1988). 
This approach is related to that of Holt (1980) who 
discusses labour-market allocation both by wages and job 
availibility. 
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Kx is derived in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) to depend on 
the number of firms and the parameter that describes the 
relative weights of goods consumption and real money 
balances in the consumers' utility function. 
This assumption has no consequences for the derived 
bargaining outeome. 
This can be seen by writing Vj/(w^-px)«f (/3). Then 
w^-f(£).px/(l-f(/3)), so that: 
dWj/d/3=-f'(/3).px/(l-f(/3))2. 
In this section a variable x with a "••'" does not denote a 
relative change in x, but it represents dx/dt. 
In fact, eq. (29) would suggest to use the specification 
(dk/dt-dn1/dt) instead of (n-n1). However numerical 
simulations give qualitatively similar results for this 
specification. 
The roots in the case of a 5% decrease in the money stock 
are (where the first item in the vector is the real part and 
the second one denotes the imaginary part): (0.67, 1.11), 
(0.67, -1.11), (-0.75, 0.0), (-0.07, 0.55), (-0.07, -0.55) 
and (-0.05, 0.0); and in the case of a 5% decrease in 
productivity: (0.60, 1.03), (0.60, -1.03), (-0.08, 0.55), 
(-0.08, -0.55), (-0.73, 0.0) and (-0.04, 0.0). Thus, there 
are four roots with negative real parts and two roots with 
positive real parts. 
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